TORTS-APPLICABILITY OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR TO THE COMMER-

CIAL LANDOWNER-Brown

v. Racquet Club, 95 N.J. 280, 471

A.2d 25 (1984).
Courts have described res ipsa loquitur as a situation in
which both the fact and the nature of an injury "speak" and furnish proof of negligence.' The basis for the res ipsa doctrine is
that the facts support the probability that negligence was the
cause of the injury. 2 Res ipsa loquitur also flows from the premise
that, in the ordinary experience of man, the accident would not
have occurred in the absence of negligence.' The New Jersey
Supreme Court recently examined the doctrine and its applicability to a commercial landowner in the case of Brown v. Racquet
Club.4
The defendant, Racquet Club of Bricktown (Racquet Club),
made its premises 5 available for social functions in order to famil-6
iarize people with its facilities and to attract prospective patrons.
On April 17, 1977, the Ocean Tennis Association hosted a fashion show and luncheon on the second floor of the clubhouse. 7
Access to the second floor was provided by an interior, wooden
stairway, which originated from the entrance floor. 8 Plaintiffs
Margaret Piscal and Jerilyn Brown were standing on the stairway
when it collapsed. 9 Both women sustained injuries and instituted
suit against the Racquet Club.'"
The Racquet Club property had been owned previously by
T. Harry Lang and Associates (Lang), which began construction
I Heckel & Harper, Effect of the Doctnne of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 22 ILL. L. REV. 724,

724 (1928).
2 Id.
3 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 39, at 213 (4th ed. 1971).
4 95 N.J. 280, 471 A.2d 25 (1984).
5 Id. at 286, 471 A.2d at 28. The premises consisted of a clubhouse building
with adjacent tennis courts. Id.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 286-87, 471 A.2d at 28. The date was 11 months after the certificate of

occupancy had been issued. Id.
8 Id. at 287, 471 A.2d at 28.
9 Id. At trial, it was ascertained that the stairs were attached with plain nails. Id.
at 294 n.2, 471 A.2d at 32 n.2. Moreover, the building inspector stated that "he
never noticed anything unusual about the stairs and . . . thought they were safe."

Id. at 294, 471 A.2d at 32.
10 Id. at 287, 471 A.2d at 28. Initially at the trial court level, T. Harry Lang and

Associates, which began construction of the Racquet Club, was also named as a
defendant. It was not, however, involved in any of the subsequent appeals. See id. at
287 n.1, 471 A.2d at 28 n.l.
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of the facility in 1975." During the course of construction, however, Lang experienced financial difficulties and one of its creditors, the Glen Rock Lumber Company (Glen Rock), executed
upon a judgment and assumed ownership.' 2 Shortly thereafter,
Stephen Leone, president of Glen Rock, founded the Racquet
3
Club, which he began to operate as a tennis club.'
At trial, the plaintiffs' counsel relied upon the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur, arguing that the facts presented raised an inference
of negligence on the part of the defendant.1 4 The defendant,
however, claimed that application of the doctrine would unjustly
result in its being held vicariously liable' 5 for the negligence of
its predecessor in title. 1 6 Rejecting the defendant's argument, the
trial court determined that the doctrine was applicable and
charged the jury accordingly.' 7 The jury was instructed that it
should find the defendant liable if it determined that the stairs
had constituted a "hazardous condition," which the defendant
had failed to take reasonable measures to remedy, regardless of
whether the defendant had actual or constructive notice of the
defect. ' 8
Id. at 286-87, 471 A.2d at 28.
Id. at 287, 471 A.2d at 28. Stephen Leone acquired title while the building
was still under construction. The stairs that collapsed beneath the plaintiffs had
already been installed by a subcontractor, who had been employed by T. Harry
Lang and Associates. Id. at 300, 471 A.2d at 35 (Schreiber, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
13 Id. at 287, 471 A.2d at 28.
14 Id. When a plaintiff is unable to offer direct evidence of negligence, he is permitted to rely upon the res ipsa loquitur rule and make out a case from which negligence may be inferred. Carpenter, The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 1 U. CHi. L. REV.
519, 526 (1934). In a res ipsa case, the facts must be such that "in the general
experience of mankind, the event producing the injury does not happen unless the
person in control has failed to exercise due care." Cicero v. Nelson Transp. Co.,
129 N.J.L. 493, 495, 30 A.2d 67, 69 (1943).
15 Vicarious liability can be illustrated as follows: "A is negligent, B is not."
However, by virtue of some relationship between A and B, although B played no
role in the mishap that resulted in injuries to C; in C's action against B, B "becomes
liable as a defendant for C's injuries, on the basis of A's negligence." W. PROSSER,
supra note 3, § 69, at 458. The above concept can be applied directly to the facts of
Brown. Specifically, a large portion of the construction of the building, including
installation of the stairs, had been completed while Lang held title to the property.
See Brown, 95 N.J. at 286-87, 471 A.2d at 28. Consequently, any negligence in the
installation or construction of the stairs probably occurred during Lang's ownership. Nevertheless, under the theory of vicarious liability any negligence is imputed
to the successor in title. See id. at 298, 471 A.2d at 34 (Schreiber, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
16 Brown, 95 N.J. at 287, 471 A.2d at 28.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 287-88, 471 A.2d at 28.
''
12
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The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs.' 9 The defendant's motions for a new trial and for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict were denied.2 ° The trial court's judgment was
affirmed by the appellate division, which held that the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur could be applied to a successor in title in the
commercial context. 2 ' The appellate panel also determined that
the jury charge had been equitable.2 2 The New Jersey Supreme
Court granted certification and affirmed the appellate division's
determination 23 that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applicable to a successor in title. 24 The court found, however, that the
inclusion of the hazardous condition instruction, especially when
"juxtaposed with the charge on res ipsa loquitur," had forced the
jury to evaluate the defendant's duty of care in an overly strict
vein. 25 Accordingly, the judgment was reversed, and the matter
was remanded for a new trial.2 6
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has its origins in England.
The doctrine was first clearly enunciated in the famous case of
Byrne v. Boadle.27 In Byrne, the plaintiff, while walking down a public street, was struck by a barrel of flour, which fell from a window.28 The Court of Exchequer, reasoning that barrels do not
fall from windows in the absence of negligence, imposed upon
the defendant the duty to prevent such an occurrence. 29 More19 Id. at 288, 471 A.2d at 28.

Id.
Compare Brown (liability of successor in title for negligence of predecessor determined under doctrine of res ipsa loquitur) with Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc.,
86 NJ. 332, 431 A.2d 811 (1981) (strict liability applied to successor corporation
for injuries caused by products defectively made by predecessor corporation).
22 Brown, 95 N.J. at 288, 471 A.2d at 29.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 295, 471 A.2d at 32.
25 Id. at 296-97, 471 A.2d at 33. The court noted that as a result of the "hazardous condition" instruction, the jury's deliberations diverged from the theory upon
which the case was tried, namely negligence. Examination of the facts under the
"hazardous condition" standard, as charged by the trial court, effectively precluded
the jury from considering the defendant's alleged negligence. See id. at 296, 471
A.2d at 33.
26 Id. at 297, 471 A.2d at 34.
27 159 Eng. Rep. 299, 301 (1863).
28 Id. at 299. The plaintiffs brought suit seeking damages for their resultant injuries. During the course of the trial, however, the plaintiffs failed to offer any evidence of negligence and relied solely on the circumstances surrounding the
incident itself. The assessor found no evidence probative as to the issue of the
defendant's negligence and, accordingly, nonsuited the plaintiff. Id. At the Court
of Exchequer, Chief Baron Pollack reversed the lower court's decision. Id. at 301.
29 Id. The court correctly noted that a dealer in flour, or any merchant for that
matter, has a duty to conduct his business in a manner that is not injurious to the
20
21
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over, the court held that the inability of the plaintiff to offer specific evidence of a breach of that duty would not preclude a
finding of negligence. 30 According to the court, the fact that the
barrel fell and injured the plaintiff was prima facie evidence of
the defendant's negligence. 3 '
While Byrne established that the occurrence of an accident
may afford prima facie evidence of negligence, the practical effect
of res ipsa loquitur is to allow a "permissible inference [of negligence,] which the jury may or may not draw."' 32 Res ipsa loquitur
33
permits the proof of negligence by circumstantial evidence if
the circumstances relied upon to support such an allegation are
closely and immediately connected with the injury. 4 The negligence alleged and the injury sustained, therefore, must have the
relationship of cause and effect . 3 5 Upon such a showing, an inference is raised, which constitutes prima facie evidence of a lack of
due care, 3 6 thus placing the burden of explanation upon the person charged with responsibility.3 7 The evidence offered by way of
public at large. Id. It seems apparent that the court's decision was predicated upon
the rationale that such an occurrence is strongly indicative, in and of itself, of a
want of due care. See id.
30 Id. at 299-300. The lower court found that the lack of evidence offered by the
plaintiff was fatal to his cause of action. In reversing, however, the Court of Exchequer found that to compel the plaintiff to introduce specific evidence of negligence would be an unreasonable burden. See id.
31 Id. at 301.
32 Gould v. Winokur, 98 N.J. Super. 554, 563, 237 A.2d 916, 921 (Law Div.
1968), affd, 104 N.J. Super. 329, 250 A.2d 38 (App. Div.), certif denied, 53 N.J. 582,
252 A.2d 158 (1969); see Den Braven v. Meyer Bros., 1 N.J. 470, 64 A.2d 219
(1949).
33 W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 39, at 211-12. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
and the permissible inference of negligence that arises under it cannot be invoked
in all instances in which an accident occurs with a resultant injury. Rather, the
evidence produced must allow a reasonable man to conclude that it is "more likely
than not" that the mishap was the result of the defendant's negligence and, more
specifically, that the defendant breached some duty that he owed to the plaintiff. Id.
at 211.
34 Carpenter, supra note 14, at 520. Essentially, the purport of this requirement
is that the accident and injury be reasonably contemporaneous.
35 Id. Thus, once the relationship of cause and effect is established between the
accident and the injury, an inference of negligence may be drawn. This ensures
that the accident was not attributable to the actions of a third party. See generally
Den Braven v. Meyer Bros., 1 N.J. 470, 473, 64 A.2d 219, 221 (1949) (instrumentality causing accident must have been under control of defendant, and not third
party, at time of mishap).
36 See, e.g., Hughes v. Atlantic City & Shore R.R., 85 N.J.L. 212, 89 A. 769
(1913); Mumma v.Easton & Amboy R.R., 73 N.J.L. 653, 659, 165 A. 208, 210
(1905).
37 See Hamrah v. Clements, 3 N.J. 285, 289, 69 A.2d 720, 721 (1949) (citations
omitted).
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explanation must be convincing and must show exactly how the
harm occurred." The burden of producing explanatory evidence
does not affect the ultimate burden of persuasion, which remains
with the plaintiff;39 but, in realistic terms, the burden of persuasion is shifted to the defendant.4a If the defendant fails to furnish
sufficient evidence to rebut the permissible inference that is created by the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, then the jury may find
him negligent.4 '
In New Jersey, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was most
clearly articulated in the seminal case of Bornstein v. Metropolitan
Bottling Co. 4 2 In that case, the court held that a permissible inference of negligence arises where "(a) the occurrence itself ordinarily bespeaks negligence; (b) the instrumentality was within the
defendant's exclusive control; and (c) there [was] no indication in
the circumstances that the injury was the result of the plaintiff's
own voluntary act or neglect." '4 3 The first requirement is based

upon the belief that the event that produced the injury ordinarily
does not occur unless the person in control has been negligent.44
The second requirement-that of "exclusive control"--has been
scrutinized closely by the New Jersey courts.4 5 Specifically, ques38 See Brown, 95 N.J. at 289, 471 A.2d at 29 (citing Ferdinand v. Agricultural Ins.
Co., 22 N.J. 482, 493, 126 A.2d 323, 329 (1956)). Once a res ipsa case is established by the plaintiff, the defendant normally must furnish evidence to overcome
the presumption of negligence that arises under the doctrine. The requisite weight
of this evidence varies. Generally, there have been three accepted views: (1) the
least effect given to the presumption occurs when it is only viewed as "furnishing
some evidence of negligence," such that the plaintiffs case will reach the jury if the
defendant fails to offer rebutting evidence; (2) sometimes the presumption is held
to require the "defendant to come forward with explanation or rebutting evidence;" (3) other jurisdictions go so far as to hold that once the plaintiff has made a
res ipsa case, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant. F. HARPER, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 77, at 184-85 (1933).
39 See Gaglio v. Yellow Cab Co., 63 N.J. Super. 206, 210, 164 A.2d 353, 355
(App. Div. 1960).
40 Gould v. Winokur, 98 N.J. Super. 554, 564, 237 A.2d 916, 921 (Law Div.
1968), aftd, 104 N.J. Super. 329, 250 A.2d 381 (App. Div.), certif denied, 53 N.J. 582,
252 A.2d 157 (1969). If the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is to be of any use to a
plaintiff, it must shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant. Such a shift is
derived from the basic proposition underlying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,
namely that in the ordinary course of events, certain injuries do not occur in the
absence of negligence. Heckel & Harper, supra note 1, at 725. Thus, when there is
such an event, the defendant should have to come forward with sufficient explanatory evidence that will satisfy the burden of persuasion placed upon him. See id.
41 Carpenter, supra note 14, at 523.
42 26 N.J. 263, 139 A.2d 404 (1958).
43 Id. at 269, 139 A.2d at 408.
44 Kahalili v. Rosecliff Realty Co., 26 N.J. 595, 606, 141 A.2d 301, 307 (1958).
45 See, e.g., Hillas v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 120 N.J. Super. 105, 293 A.2d
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tions have been raised with respect to the time at which control
by the defendant is required in order to invoke the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur.4 6 For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court,
in Den Braven v. Meyer Brothers,4 7 determined that control, and

possible resultant culpability, had to be measured as of the time
that the incident occurred.4" According to a more logical explanation, proffered by Justice Francis in Bornstein, control would be
measured at the time that the negligence-rather than the accident-occurred.4 9
In order to comply with the third component of the Bornstein
test, the plaintiff must establish, to a standard of "more probable
than not," that the defendant's negligence was the cause of the
accident. 50 Res ipsa loquitur thus will not be applied if it is
"equally probable" that the negligence was attributable to someone other than the defendant. 5' The evidence offered under the
"more probable than not" standard must cover all of the elements of negligence and it must point to a breach of the defendant's duty.52
Res ipsa loquitur, however, only creates the inference that
the defendant has not exercised reasonable care; it does not, in
53
and of itself, suffice as proof that he was under a duty to do so.

Thus, it is the plaintiff's obligation to show that such a duty exists.54 The nature of the duty is shaped by the status of the de419 (App. Div. 1972); Francois v. American Stores Co., 46 N.J. Super. 394, 398,
132 A.2d 799, 801 (App. Div. 1957).
46 Compare Bornstein, 26 N.J. at 276, 139 A.2d at 411 (Francis, J., concurring)
(control at time of indicated negligence) with Brown, 95 N.J. at 290, 471 A.2d at 30
(control at time of mishap).
47 1 N.J. 470, 64 A.2d 219 (1949).
48 Id. at 473, 64 A.2d at 221.
49 See Bornstein, 26 N.J. at 276, 139 A.2d at 411 (Francis, J., concurring); see also
Brown, 95 N.J, at 290, 471 A.2d at 30 (discussing Justice Francis's concurrence in
Bornstein); cf. W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 39, at 221 (advocating that concept of
control be discarded and replaced with idea that "apparent cause of accident must
be such that the defendant would be responsible for any negligence connected with
it").
50 Bornstein, 26 N.J. at 273, 139 A.2d at 410. Under the standard of "more probable than not," a plaintiff is not required to exclude other persons or causes that
may have been responsible for the mishap. Id.
51

Id.

52 W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 39, at 212.
53 Id. at 226.
54 See Malone, Res lpsa Loquitur and Proof by Inference-A Discussion of the Louisiana

Cases, 4 LA. L. REV. 70, 74 (1941). The issue of duty is certainly a consideration
when determining the applicability of res ipsa loquitur. Nevertheless, an accident
can be attributable to many causes, none of which may constitute a breach of the
defendant's duty. For instance, an accident may be the product of the negligence
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fendant and his relationship to other parties.5 5
For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in Butler v.
Acme Markets, Inc. ,56 imposed upon proprietors of business premises the duty to provide "invitees ' ' 57 with a "reasonably safe place
to do that which is within the scope of the invitation. ' 58 Although
New Jersey courts have recognized that an owner or occupant of
business premises is not an insurer, they have nevertheless imposed liability on an owner or occupant where an invitee has sustained injuries as a result of defects, of which the owner or
occupant had either actual or constructive notice. 59 Thus, in the
context of landowners, notice, either actual or constructive, imposes upon the owner the affirmative duty to inspect the premises and render them safe. 60 That duty not only extends to the
discovery of patent defects, but it also makes the owner responsible for those defects "which have existed for so long a time that,
by the exercise of reasonable care, he had both an opportunity to
discover and to remedy."'" A landowner's duty also requires him
to prevent risks that are reasonably foreseeable. 6 2 In sum, a proprietor is under a pervasive duty to exercise due care and to
render his premises safe under all circumstances arising within
of both parties, or neither of them. Thus, the occurrence of an accident should not
be relied upon when seeking to apportion responsibility. See id. at 75.
55 F. HARPER, supra note 38, § 99, at 228. The plaintiffs in Brown were "invitees," see infra note 57, and as such were owed a higher duty of care than trespassers. They came upon the defendant's premises either through an express or
implied invitation. Consequently, there was an affirmative duty on the part of the
defendant to render the premises safe. See F. HARPER, supra note 38, § 98, at 227.
56 89 N.J. 270, 445 A.2d 1141 (1982).
57 A person is an "invitee" on land of another if (1) he enters by invitation,
express or implied, (2) his entry is connected with the owner's business or with an
activity the owner conducts or permits to be conducted on his land, and (3) there is
mutuality of benefit or benefit to the owner. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 742 (5th ed.
1979).
58 Butler, 89 N.J. at 275, 445 A.2d at 1143; see Brown, 95 N.J. at 290, 471 A.2d at
30.
59 See, e.g., Francisco v. Miller, 14 N.J. Super. 290, 296-97, 81 A.2d 803, 806
(App. Div. 1951); Daddetto v. Barbiera, 4 N.J. Super. 479, 481, 67 A.2d 691, 691
(App. Div. 1949).
60 Notice is a vague term for knowledge. A landowner has an affirmative duty to
those who enter upon his premises. A breach of that duty would demonstrate a
disregard or indifference toward dangerous conditions present on his land. Consequently, once the landowner gains or should have gained knowledge of a defect on
his premises, his duty to remedy the condition is triggered. That duty must be fulfilled within a reasonable time. See Francisco v. Miller, 14 N.J. Super. 290, 297, 81
A.2d 803, 806 (App. Div. 1951).
61 Id. at 296-97, 81 A.2d at 806. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 343 comment b (1966) (occupier's duty includes discovery of unknown defects).
62 W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 61, at 393.
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the scope of that duty.63
In Brown, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur had been invoked properly against the
Racquet Club.6" The court reversed and remanded for a new
trial, however, on account of the trial court's jury instruction with
respect to hazardous conditions. 65 Writing for the majority, Justice Handler stated that the court could not conclude that the
jury's finding of liability had not been influenced by the inclusion
of the additional instruction.6 6
The court relied upon the three-part analysis enunciated in
Bornstein to determine how the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
should be applied to commercial landowners who are successors
in title. In finding that the first condition of Bornstein had been
met, the Brown court noted that the collapse of the Racquet
Club's stairs "[bespoke] negligence. ' 67 The court also summarily
noted that the stairs-the instrumentality that caused the plaintiffs' injuries-were under the Racquet Club's "exclusive control
at the time of their collapse. "68 Moreover, it was obvious to the
court that the plaintiffs' conduct had not contributed to their injuries and that, therefore, the third criterion of Bornstein had been
satisfied. 69 According to Justice Handler, however, the critical issue "in determining the applicability of res ipsa loquitur in [Brown]
70
depend[ed] on the scope of [the Racquet Club's] duty of care."
The court recognized that the nature and extent of a commercial landowner's duty of care is shaped both by his status and
by his relationship to those who enter upon his premises. 7 As a
proprietor, the Racquet Club was under a duty to exercise reasonable care and to " 'render the premises safe for activities
within the scope of the invitation.' ",72 According to the court,
Bozza v. Vornado, Inc., 42 N.J. 355, 359, 200 A.2d 777, 779 (1964).
Brown, 95 N.J. at 295, 471 A.2d at 32.
Id. at 296-97, 471 A.2d at 33.
Id.
Seeid. at 289, 471 A.2d at 29; cf. Galbraith v. Smith, 120 N.J.L. 515, 1 A.2d 34
(1938) (falling of chandelier, which was fastened to ceiling, "bespeaks"
negligence).
68 Brown, 95 N.J. at 289, 471 A.2d at 29.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 289-90, 471 A.2d at 29.
71 Id. at 290, 471 A.2d at 29. In Brown, a proprietor/invitee relationship existed
between the parties. See id. at 286-87, 471 A.2d at 28. In such a relationship the
proprietor owes a duty of care to the invitee. See Brody v. Albert Lifson & Sons, 17
N.J. 383, 389, 111 A.2d 504, 507 (1955).
72 Brown, 95 N.J. at 290, 471 A.2d at 30 (quoting Butler, 89 N.J. at 272, 445 A.2d
at 1143).
63
64
65
66
67
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that duty required it to inspect the premises "to discover their
actual condition and any latent defects." '7 3 The court remarked,
however, that a proprietor would not be liable for injuries caused
by defects of which he had neither actual nor implied notice, nor
reasonable opportunity to discover. 4
The defendant had never addressed squarely the issue of notice. 75 Rather, it had focused on other possible causes of the accident, including the fact that the stairs had been constructed and
installed by a third party who
had been employed by the defendant's predecessor in title. 76 The court determined that such a
showing was insufficient to rebut the inference that the Racquet
Club's negligence was a contributing cause of the resulting accident. 7 7 The court also rejected the defendant's contention that
the negligence of its predecessor in title created an undiscoverable, latent defect. 78 The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the court
reasoned, was applicable "unless defendant's explanation of the
accident conclusively negated any inference that the defendant
failed to discharge the duty of care it owed to its invited patrons,
namely, to make a reasonable inspection that would have disclosed the existence of the defect." ' 79 The court did qualify its
position, however, by explaining that, once a reasonable inspection has been undertaken, failure either to discover a defect or to
make an extraordinary inspection would not give rise to an inference of negligence.80 The determination of what is "reasonable,"
according to the court, is dictated by the circumstances, and failure to conduct a reasonable inspection would permit an inference of negligence in the absence of any convincing evidence to
the contrary. 8 ' The court thus placed two burdens upon commerId. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343 comment (b) (1966)).
Id. at 293, 471 A.2d at 31 (citing, for example, Dwyer v. Skyline Apartments,
Inc., 123 N.J. Super. 48, 301 A.2d 463 (App. Div.), aftFd, 63 N.J. 577, 311 A.2d 1
(1973)).
75 See id. at 291, 471 A.2d at 30.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 292, 471 A.2d at 31.
78 Id. at 291, 471 A.2d at 30.
79 Id. at 293, 471 A.2d at 31.
80 Id. (citing Dwyer v. Skyline Apartments, Inc., 123 N.J. Super. 48, 301 A.2d
463 (App. Div.), afd, 63 N.J. 577, 311 A.2d 1 (1973); Dombrowska v. KresgeNewark, Inc., 75 N.J. Super. 271, 183 A.2d 111 (App. Div. 1962)). It should be
noted that in Dombrowska v. Kresge-Newark, Inc., the appellate division recognized the
need for a proprietor to have received notice of the dangerous condition before his
duty to remedy the condition would arise. Dombrowska, 75 N.J. Super. at 275, 183
A.2d at 113.
81 Brown, 95 N.J. at 293, 471 A.2d at 31 (citing, for example, Galbraith v. Smith,
120 N.J.L. 515, 1 A.2d 34 (1938)).
73
74
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cial landowners: the duty to make an inspection and the duty to
ascertain whether such inspection was "reasonable under the
circumstances."82
Justice Handler reasoned that the collapse of the stairs was
caused at least partially by the defendant's failure to make a reasonable inspection,8 3 because such an inspection would have revealed that the stairs had been installed defectively. 84 The court
also observed that the defendant had occupied the premises for a
sufficient period of time to allow for such an inspection. 5 The
court therefore concluded that the defendant's failure to make a
reasonable inspection during its occupation of the premises gave
rise to an allowable inference that its negligence contributed to
the collapse of the stairs.8 6
Justice Handler next addressed the trial court's additional
jury instruction on hazardous conditions.87 The validity of that
instruction was deemed tenuous because the trial court had failed
to provide a standard for determining what was "hazardous. 8 8
The absence of any limiting instruction, the court observed, was
especially relevant because Brown involved the collapse of a stairway, a situation that could readily be characterized as a hazardous
82 See id. This dual burden imposed by the Brown court allows the factual circumstances to dictate the type of inspections that must be undertaken by the
owner/occupier. See id. By imposing this standard, courts are given a wide degree
of latitude when scrutinizing the propriety of a landowner's conduct with regard to
those who enter upon his premises.
83 Id. The court noted that the plaintiff need only show that the negligence of
the defendant contributed to the accident. Id.
84 Id. at 294, 471 A.2d at 32. This particular aspect of the majority's opinion is
difficult to reconcile with the "more probable than not" standard. The court expressed the belief that the plaintiff must show only that the defendant's negligence
may have contributed to the accident. Under this standard it is unclear whether the
defendant must simply omit a duty or whether a breach of that duty must be the
most significant factor contributing to the mishap. See id. at 292-93, 471 A.2d at 31.
85 Id. at 294, 471 A.2d at 32. Eleven months had elapsed between the time at
which the certificate of occupancy was issued and the time of the collapse of the
stairs. Id. at 287, 471 A.2d at 28.
86 See id. at 294, 471 A.2d at 32. Stephen Leone, president of one of the Racquet
Club's creditors, stated that "the stairs looked substantial," and that there was no
reason to examine how the stairs were fastened to the wall. Moreover, he admitted
that he never bothered to see how the stairs were fastened. Essentially absent from
his testimony was any suggestion that a reasonable inspection was conducted, regardless of whether or not the defect was latent. Id. at 294-95, 471 A.2d at 32.
87 See id. at 295, 471 A.2d at 32. The purport of the trial court's instruction was
that, if the jury concluded that the stairs constituted a hazardous condition, the
defendant would be liable, regardless of whether the Racquet Club had actual or
constructive notice of the defect. Id. at 295-96, 471 A.2d at 33.
88 See id. at 295, 471 A.2d at 33.
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condition. 89 Because the trial court's instruction permitted the
jury to find liability without determining the issue of negligence,
the supreme court could not conclude-as the9 0appellate division
had-that, in context, the error was harmless.
Justice Schreiber, joined by Justice O'Hern, concurred in
part and dissented in part.9" Initially, Justice Schreiber's analysis
centered upon the majority's assumption that a defendant bears
the burden of coming forward with proof of a reasonable inspection.9 2 Justice Schreiber asserted that it is incumbent upon a
plaintiff to prove both that the defendant failed to make a reasonable inspection and that, if the inspection had been conducted,
the defect would have been uncovered.93 The plaintiffs in Brown,
he observed, did not show that the Racquet Club had breached
its duty; they also failed to rebut evidence-introduced by the
Racquet Club-that the defect in the stairs was latent.94
Justice Schreiber believed that the duty that a proprietor
owes to his invitees-to provide reasonably safe premisesshould extend to protect those invitees from dangerous conditions created by a predecessor in title." His position was supported by the analogy drawn between the facts of Brown and the
imposition upon successor corporations of strict liability in tort
"for damages caused by . . . defects in products manufactured

and distributed by [their] predecessors. '96 In fact, Justice Schreiber opined that the need to impose strict liability under circum89

See id.; supra note 68 and accompanying text.

90 Brown, 95 N.J. at 296, 471 A.2d at 33.
91 Id. at 297, 471 A.2d at 34 (Schreiber, J., concurring in part and dissenting in

part).
92 Id. See generally Gould v. Winokur, 98 N.J. Super. 554, 564, 237 A.2d 916, 921
(Law Div. 1968) (in res ipsa case, burden of proof remains upon plaintiff, but realistically burden of persusion shifts to defendant), aff'd, 104 N.J. Super. 329, 250 A.2d
38 (App. Div.), certif denied, 53 N.J. 582, 252 A.2d 157 (1969).
93 Brown, 95 N.J. at 297, 471 A.2d at 34 (Schreiber, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
94 Id. at 297-98, 471 A.2d at 34 (Schreiber, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). The stairs that collapsed beneath the plaintiffs were affixed by nails "that
protruded about one-half to one inch from the beam to which each step was attached." Therefore, it could not be determined through a visual inspection how the
stairs were attached to the wall. Id. at 298, 471 A.2d at 34. (Schreiber, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
95 Id. at 300, 471 A.2d at 35 (Schreiber, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
96 Id.; cf. Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 86 N.J. 332, 431 A.2d 811 (1981). The
successor corporation in Ramirez never had control over the defective product manufactured by its predecessor. Yet, because it continued to manufacture the same
line of products, the court concluded that imposition of strict liability was appropriate. See id. at 358, 431 A.2d at 825.
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stances such as those in Brown is greater than in the successor
corporation context, because of the "direct relationship" that existed between the plaintiff and the Racquet Club.9 7
Finally, Justice Schreiber discounted the need for a proprietor to have received notice of a defective condition before he can
be held liable for any resultant injuries sustained by his invitees. 98 He reasoned that notice should not be a factor when the
hazardous condition is created either by the owner or by a third
party under his care. 9 9 In reaching this conclusion, Justice Schreiber utilized a strict liability approach and concluded that "[a]s
between the business proprietor and the innocent, invited patron
injured as a result of a dangerous structural condition on the
premises, equities favor imposing the costs attributable to the in'
jury on the owner.
Justice Clifford, in a dissenting opinion, noted that the plaintiffs had failed to allege any cause for the collapse of the stairs
other than the fact that they had been improperly appended to
the wall by short nails."'' According to the dissent, "[n]o reason10 2
able inspection would have disclosed [that] latent condition."'
He opined that such a narrow offer of proof did not entitle the
plaintiff to an inference of negligence under the doctrine of res
03
ipsa loquitur. 1
Focusing upon the issue of control, Justice Clifford asserted
that the only logical application of that requirement must be to
look at control at the time of the negligence rather than at the
time of the accident. 10 4 Under such an application, the dissent
reasoned, the plaintiff might have had a cause of action under res
ipsa loquitur against the builder of the stairs, but not against the
Racquet Club, a successor in title.' 5 Justice Clifford agreed with
Justice Schreiber that it was the plaintiffs' obligation-and not
97 Brown, 95 N.J. at 300, 471 A.2d at 35 (Schreiber, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
98 Id. at 301, 471 A.2d at 36 (Schreiber, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
99 Id. (citing Bozza v. Vornado, Inc., 42 N.J. 355, 360, 200 A.2d 777, 780
(1964)).
100 Id. at 301-02, 471 A.2d at 36 (Schreiber, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
101 Id. at 303, 471 A.2d at 37 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 See id. at 304, 471 A.2d at 37 (Clifford, J., dissenting); see Bornstein, 26 N.J. at
275-76, 139 A.2d at 411 (Francis, J., concurring) (control should relate to time of
negligence and not time at which accident occurred).
105 Brown, 95 N.J. at 305, 471 A.2d at 38 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
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the Racquet Club's-to prove that if a reasonable inspection had
been conducted, the defect would have been revealed. 10 6 Therefore, Justice Clifford concluded that, because the plaintiffs in
Brown had failed to satisfy their burden of proof, the court should
have reversed.10 7
In drawing its conclusion, the Brown majority blended two
important principles of law: the landowner's duty of care to those
who enter upon his premises'0 8 and the permissible inference of
negligence created by the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 10 9 Res
ipsa loquitur leads only to the conclusion that the defendant has
not exercised reasonable care. " 0 The existence of a duty to exercise such care is dependent upon the parties' relative status."' In
Brown the defendant Racquet Club, as a proprietor, owed a duty
2 -to maintain safe premises. 113
to the plaintiffs-its invitees'
The court found that the defendant had breached that duty by
applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur." 4
This conclusion, however, was reached without any consideration of the defendant as a successor entity. Such an omission
becomes questionable when it is viewed against the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur, a theory under which control of the instrumentality is a vital element.'
By holding that control should relate
to the time of the accident, and not to the time of the alleged
negligence," 16 the Brown court avoided the possible inapplicability of res ipsa loquitur. Logically, if, as in Brown, a case is being
presented on a theory of negligence, any consideration of control
should focus on the time of the negligence and not the time of
117
the injury.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 57 & 58 and accompanying text.
109 See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
110 W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 39, at 226. Res ipsa loquitur does not itself afford
proof that the defendant was under a duty to exercise reasonable care to a particular individual at a specific time. Id.
I I F. HARPER, supra note 38, § 99, at 228. As a result, a trespasser who is injured
by a defective condition on the premises "may have no right to recover" for his
injuries. W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 39, at 226.
112 See W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 61.
113 See Brown, 95 N.J. at 296, 471 A.2d at 33.
114 See id. at 295, 471 A.2d at 32.
115 The Brown court openly acknowledged that control at the time of the indicated negligence is a logical application. See id. at 290, 471 A.2d at 30. It dealt with
the issue of control, however, in terms of the happening of the accident. Id.
116 See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
117 See Bornstein, 26 N.J. at 275-76, 139 A.2d at 411 (Francis, J., concurring). The
position taken by Justice Francis in Bornstein is in accord with that of Dean Prosser,
106
107
108
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The court characterized Brown a res ipsa loquitur case and
ostensibly rendered its decision within the parameters of that
doctrine. Nevertheless, as noted by Justice Schreiber, the facts
presented in Brown are analogous to those in cases in which strict
liability has been imposed upon the successor entity." 8 Notably,
in Ramirez v. Amsted Industries, Inc.," 9 the New Jersey Supreme
Court held that where a corporation acquires the assets of another corporation and continues to manufacture the same product or product line "the purchasing corporation is strictly liable
for injuries caused by [manufacturing] defects . . .even if previously manufactured and distributed by the selling corporation or
its predecessor."' 2 ° The imposition of strict liability in such a
context has been seen "as a means of providing a financial incentive for manufacturers of products to reduce the level of accidents below that which would exist under a negligence standard
of liability."'' This essentially is an attempt by courts to compel
"manufacturer[s] to avoid accidents where the cost of avoidance
is less than the cost of potential accidents."'' 2 2 It should be noted,
however, that strict liability has only been imposed for injuries
caused by defectively manufactured products, and not in situations wherein a visitor or customer of a business enterprise is
12 3
injured.
who believes the standard should be "that the apparent cause of the accident must
be such that the defendant would be responsible for any negligence connected with
it."W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 39, at 221.
118 See Brown, 95 N.J. at 300, 471 A.2d at 35 (Schreiber, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
''9 86 N.J. 332, 431 A.2d 811 (1981).
120 Id. at 358, 431 A.2d at 825. The Ramirez court advanced three particularly
strong reasons for imposing strict liability upon successor corporations. First, the
plaintiff's remedy against the original manufacturer was lost when its assets were
purchased. Second, imposition of liability upon the successor corporation "is consistent with the public policy of spreading the risk to society at large for the cost of
injuries from defective products." Id. at 350, 431 A.2d at 820. Finally, the Ramirez
court noted that "the imposition upon Amsted [the successor corporation] of responsibility to answer claims of liability for injuries allegedly caused by defective
Johnson [the predecessor corporation] presses is justified as a burden necessarily
attached to its enjoyment ofJohnson's trade name, good will and the continuation
of an established manufacturing enterprise." Id. at 352, 431 A.2d at 822.
121 Ursin, Strict Liabilityfor Defective Business Premises-One Step Beyond Rowland and
Greenman, 22 UCLA L. REV. 820, 829 (1975) (Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal.2d
108,443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968), represents furtherjudicial development
toward doctrine of strict liability for dangerously defective business premises).
122 Id.
123 Despite the somewhat doctored version of res ipsa loquitur that was adopted
by the Brown court, the clear thrust of the opinion is a move toward strict liability
for dangerously defective business premises. New Jersey has recognized strict liability for manufacturers of defective products, a position which is completely in
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It is apparent that if the doctrine of strict liability in tort were
extended to situations in which business premises are defective,
then the actual attribution of whose negligence caused the resultant injury would become insignificant. 124 The facts of Brown provided an ideal situation for application of strict liability-the
stairs that collapsed had been installed prior to the Racquet
Club's assumption of ownership.1 25 Moreover, the specific cause
of the stairway's collapse was the small nails that were used to
attach it the wall, 12 6 a condition which was not detectable by an
ordinary inspection. 12 7 It is clear that, given the facts in Brown,
the doctrine of strict liability in tort would have been a more appropriate basis for imposing liability than the somewhat doctored
12 8
version of res ipsa loquitur that the court chose to apply.
The policy behind holding successor corporations strictly liable for the manufacturing defects of their predecessors is
accord with that of most jurisdictions. See Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach.
Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979).
124 Strict liability in tort is a theory under which liability will attach regardless of
fault. Strict liability looks only to the resulting harm, and does not seek to determine whether there has been a lack of due care. W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 75, at
494.
125 See supra note 12.
126 Brown, 95 N.J. at 292, 471 A.2d at 31. The defendant conceded that the use of
such small nails was improper, but argued that any liability resulting therefrom
should be attributed to the former owner. Id.
127 Id. at 298, 471 A.2d at 34 (Schreiber, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
128 The reason for the Brown court's failure to articulate its decision in strict liability terms is unclear, especially when the direct relationship between the parties in
Brown is juxtaposed to the plaintiff-defendant relationship in Ramirez. Specifically,
in Brown, the plaintiffs were patrons on the defendant's premises, of which the defendant had assumed ownership eleven months earlier. See id. at 287, 471 A.2d at
28. In Ramirez, however, the machine that caused the plaintiffs injuries was manufactured in 1948 or 1949. Ramirez, 86 N.J. at 335, 431 A.2d at 813. Yet, Amsted,
the successor corporation, did not purchase its predecessor's assets until 1962. Id.
Despite that span of time, the Ramirez court found that imposition of strict liability
should not be precluded. See id. at 352, 431 A.2d at 822.
In Brown, Justice Schreiber noted that:
[T]he situation at bar is somewhat analogous to the strict tort liability of
a successor corporation for damages caused by latent defects in products manufactured and distributed by its predecessor. In the product
liability case the successor entity that never had control over the defective product is nevertheless responsible. Here, in contrast, the current
owner of the real property has control over the premises and has a direct relationship to the plaintiff who has encountered the hazardous
condition upon accepting the owner's invitation to enter the premises.
If policy justifies liability in the product field, why is not the business
invitee entitled to at least similar protection?
Brown, 95 N.J. at 300, 471 A.2d at 35 (Schreiber, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
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equally applicable to other succeeding entities in a commercial
context.' 2 9 Defective business premises present as real a danger
to the public as defectively manufactured products. 31 Clearly, in
either instance, the owner or manufacturer "is in a position to
correct defective conditions and to spread these costs through a
liability insurance policy and in the pricing of its goods or
services." 131
As noted in the dissenting opinion, the collapse of stairs obviously "bespeaks negligence. "132 The plaintiff in Brown, however, failed to show whose negligence was the more significant
cause of the resulting accident. 1 33 The plaintiffs' limited offer of
proof seemed to fall below the "more probable than not" standard previously established in res ipsa cases. 134 Despite that tenuous offer of proof, the Brown court drew an especially strong
35
inference of negligence under the guise of res ipsa loquitur.
This is especially apparent in the Brown court's determination
that a defendant must "conclusively negate" any inference that it
has failed to discharge its duty.' 36 In effect, the Brown court has
created a stricter standard than has been imposed previously by
the courts, which generally have held that the defendant's proof
37
need only be explanatory and not exculpatory.
The inference of negligence applied by the Brown court is
virtually insurmountable. 3 8 The majority stated that the effect of
129 See generally Ursin, supra note 121, at 839 ("doctrine of strict liability for defective business premises seems imminent in New Jersey").
130 See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
131 Brown, 95 N.J. at 302, 471 A.2d at 36 (Schreiber, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
132 See id. at 304, 471 A.2d at 37 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
133 Id.
134 See Bornstein, 26 N.J. at 273, 139 A.2d at 410 (showing that it was "equally
probable that the negligence was that of someone other than the defendant" will
not invoke permissible inference of negligence created under doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur). In Brown, Justice Clifford correctly noted that the plaintiff had failed to
specify whose negligence was the probable cause of the mishap. Brown, 95 N.J. at
304, 471 A.2d at 37 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
135 See infra notes 136 & 137 and accompanying text.
136 Brown, 95 N.J. at 293, 471 A.2d at 31.
137 See, e.g., Hamrah v. Clements, 3 N.J. 285, 69 A.2d 720 (1949); Hughes v. Atlantic City & Shore R.R., 85 N.J.L. 212, 89 A. 769 (1914).
138 Courts have split as to the strength of the inference created by res ipsa loquitur. Compare Galbraith v.Smith, 120 N.J.L. 515, 516, 1 A.2d 34, 35 (1938) (defendant may always come forward with explanatory evidence, but inference created by
res ipsa loquitur should remain) with Gaglio v. Yellow Cab Co., 63 N.J. Super. 206,
210, 164 A.2d 353, 355 (App. Div. 1960) (res ipsa loquitur does not create pre-
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res ipsa loquitur is to create a "permissive presumption."' 39 This
is, in essence, a hybrid between a permissible inference, which
allows, but does not require, the jury to infer from the plaintiff's
case that the defendant has been negligent, and a presumption,
which requires the jury to find that the defendant was negligent if
140
he failed to submit sufficient evidence to the contrary.
In Brown, the supreme court combined these two principles
and created a standard under which a finding of the permissible
inference of negligence under res ipsa loquitur mandates a finding of negligence, unless the defendant's proofs are so strong
that they remove any reasonable doubt of negligence. 141 In creating this standard, the court effectively has precluded a defendant
from overcoming the inference of negligence that is created
under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 142 Realistically, the court
recognized that the injuries sustained by the plaintiffs were the
result of dangerously defective business premises, and thus, it
was proper to hold the Racquet Club liable. It seems apparent,
however, that the so-called "permissive presumption" created by
14 3
the Brown court comes strikingly close to strict liability in tort,
144
despite the assertions of the court to the contrary.
Michael F. Chiarella
sumption of negligence and only allows plaintiff to avoid dismissal for his failure to
prove negligence specifically).
The majority opinion in Brown, although formally recognizing that the defendant may come forward with evidence to rebut an inference of negligence, seemed to
focus upon the fact that the collapse of the stairs was the result of a dangerous
defect in the defendant's business premises. See Brown, 95 N.J. at 293-94, 471 A.2d
at 32. Thus, it can be argued that the defendant's ownership was the conclusive
factor in terms of liability.
139 Brown, 95 N.J. at 288, 471 A.2d at 29.
140 F. HARPER, supra note 38, § 77, at 184-85.
141 Brown, 95 N.J. at 289, 471 A.2d at 29 (citing Ferdinand v. Agricultural Ins.
Co., 22 N.J. 482, 493, 126 A.2d 323, 329 (1956)).
142 See supra note 134. In Brown, the burden placed upon the defendant to remove
the inference of negligence that is created by res ipsa loquitur forces the defendant
to come forward with exculpatory evidence. But cf.Hughes v. Atlantic City & Shore
R.R., 85 N.J.L. 212, 214, 89 A. 769, 770 (1914) (defendant need only come forward
with explanatory evidence).
143 Compare Brown, 95 N.J. at 288, 471 A.2d at 29 (res ipsa loquitur applied to
successor in title) with Ramirez, 86 N.J. at 358, 431 A.2d at 825 (strict liability applied to successor corporation).
144 The Brown court's accommodation of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur generated a holding that is in actuality grounded upon the doctrine of strict liability in
tort.

